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SOME DILEMMAS IN DRAWING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE 
DISTINCTION IN NEW DEAL ERA STATE 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
KEITH WHITTINGTON∗ 
Like most, I long had relatively little interest in state politics as such, 
despite a long-standing interest in federalism-related issues.1  But in recent 
years I have been gradually drawn into state constitutionalism, thanks large-
ly to work on a truly remarkable casebook project that incorporates state-
level discussions of constitutional principles into national-level debates2 
and to the amazing work of a couple of graduate students with whom I had 
the good fortune to work.3  The story of American constitutional develop-
ment is radically incomplete without an account of constitutionalism in the 
states, which supplements, extends, and contests the interpretation and con-
struction of the U.S. Constitution.  And though individual states are often 
idiosyncratic, there are broad currents of constitutional law, practice, and 
thought that flow through the states, and distinctive patterns of law and 
politics that a focus on the states can help illuminate. 
One immediate puzzle comes from a consideration of the New Deal 
period.4  Socioeconomic and political crises put established constitutional 
rules and norms under pressure, and the Great Depression is, as a conse-
quence, an important period of constitutional innovation.5  Obviously, a 
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tremendous amount of work has been done on the constitutional conflicts of 
the New Deal era at the federal level and the constitutional revolution of 
1937 in the United States Supreme Court.6  Remarkably, however, little 
work has been done on constitutional developments in the states during this 
period.  To what degree did state constitutional law lead or lag federal con-
stitutional law?  To what degree did state constitutional text and law con-
strain the kind of policy innovations that characterized the New Deal peri-
od?  To what degree were the states sites of resistance to the constitutional 
revolution that was taking place at the federal level?  Did the constitutional 
battles of the New Deal have their analogues in the states, or was the federal 
constitutional experience itself idiosyncratic and a function of the particular 
array of institutions and actors that characterized national politics of the pe-
riod?  In this Paper, I suggest the direction of an answer to such questions.  
State constitutional law has been hidden in the shadows for so long that its 
relevance to larger problems of American constitutionalism can be easily 
forgotten.  The handful of cases referenced here might help whet the appe-
tite for a larger survey of constitutional development in the states, while 
suggesting that state-level constitutional texts and judicial decisions can put 
familiar issues in constitutional law in a new light. 
This ties into the public/private distinction, but perhaps not in the usual 
ways that are currently more familiar.  I traditionally think of the pub-
lic/private distinction in terms of the Lockean liberal identification of a 
“private” sphere of religion (in particular) that is free from “public” (i.e., 
political and governmental) contestation and regulation.7 In the modern 
context, this distinction has been expanded to a broader range of moral or 
cultural issues that might be protected from politicization and political in-
terference, matters on which the state must remain “neutral.”8  In the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth century, however, economic affairs were also 
generally understood to be “private” in a similar sense and thus insulated 
from governmental interference; therefore, a key move of modern reform 
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liberalism was to shift economic affairs from the private to the public 
sphere and thus make them more tractable to government control.9 
Aspects of that shift are reflected in federal constitutional law, but the 
putatively private quality of economic behavior was often embedded in doc-
trinal background.  Barry Cushman’s account of the New Deal revolution, 
for example, observes that the “distinction between public and private 
spheres was one of the fundamental concepts of nineteenth- and early twen-
tieth-century American law,” and that the distinction was often central to a 
variety of areas of constitutional law during the period.10  This conceptual 
background helped fill in the content of the “Court’s substantive due pro-
cess jurisprudence.”11  In brief, the states’ police power could legitimately 
be used to regulate public activities for the public good, but not private ac-
tivities for private good.12  The Court, therefore, needed to be able to distin-
guish between those activities that were in their nature “public” and thereby 
subject to government manipulation and those that were “private” and 
thereby insulated from government intrusion.  Oliver Wendell Holmes 
railed against this conceptual starting point when declaring that the “Four-
teenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer’s Social Statics. . . . 
[A] constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory, 
whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the citizen to the State or 
of laissez-faire.”13 
But the state constitutions are different.  The same conceptual frame-
work that lawyers and judges deployed to understand a wide range of law 
and that Cushman (among others) described was, of course, at work in state 
constitutional law as well as federal constitutional law.  But one of the no-
table features of state constitutions is that they have fewer “glittering” gen-
eralities and more mundane specifics.14  They put the lie to John Marshall’s 
assertion that constitutions are not to have “the prolixity of a legal code.”15  
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State constitutions are less content to limit themselves to the “great out-
lines” and “important objects” of government power and more willing to 
delve into “an accurate detail” of all the “subdivisions” of power and “mi-
nor ingredients” of political objects.16  Generations of political activists 
have written and rewritten the state constitutional texts in an effort to exert 
more control over government officials and the conduct of government 
business.  In doing so, some of the doctrinal background that Holmes in-
veighed against was converted into hard-wired constitutional text.  The state 
constitutions, at least in part, embodied particular economic theories.  If 
those theories were not exactly laissez-faire, they did create some buttresses 
for the traditional public-private distinction. 
One is hard-pressed to read a large sample of state constitutional cases 
from the early twentieth century and not come away with an appreciation of 
the extent to which those were, in important ways, economic documents.  
They were centrally concerned with the management and regulation of state 
governance of economic activities, the extraction of economic resources for 
public use, the appropriation and expenditure of public funds, and the crea-
tion of fiscal liabilities.  The judicial review of state action was intimately 
and elaborately concerned with whether state officials had rigorously ob-
served those economic regulations and whether, ultimately, they had limited 
themselves to appropriate public business or tried to make use of public 
power in order to advance private interests. 
I will briefly give three illustrations of state constitutional law en-
gagement with the public/private distinction in the 1930s.  The first, Camp-
bell v. McIntyre17 comes from Tennessee and is familiar from the federal 
context.  In 1932, the Tennessee state legislature created a state accounting 
board charged with the task of examining and certifying accountants operat-
ing within the state.  The requirement for certification of “public account-
ants” applied to anyone doing “accounting work” for more than one em-
ployer.18  Unlike earlier regulations, this statute prohibited anyone from 
doing such work without a state-issued professional license (“certified pub-
lic accountants” were previously a designation of expertise rather than an 
occupational requirement).19  A non-certified public accountant, Campbell, 
challenged the statute as “unreasonable class legislation.”20  The critique of 
class legislation is familiar from police power jurisprudence,21 but the Ten-
nessee constitution offered a stronger textual hook than a mere due process 
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clause.  Campbell complained that the statute violated the Tennessee Decla-
ration of Rights, which provided that “disseized of his freehold, liberties or 
privileges” or “deprived of his life, liberty or property, but by the judgment 
of his peers or the law of the land.”22 He also contended, more concretely, 
that the law violated the special legislation provision of the Tennessee Con-
stitution.23  From Campbell’s perspective, the legislature had made “certi-
fied accountants a favored class with monopolistic privileges conferred up-
on them” and denied “private businesses the right to contract with 
whomsoever they wish to contract in purely personal matters.”24 
The justices were inclined to agree that “it is now more important to 
the preservation of constitutional government that emphasis be placed . . . 
upon the constitutional restraints on the police power of the legislature, ra-
ther than upon the extent to which that broad power may be exercised.”25  
Pointing to Meyer v. Nebraska26 as construing the “personal rights of indi-
viduals” in regard to principles that were “substantially the same” as those 
found in the Tennessee constitution, the Tennessee Supreme Court empha-
sized its duty to evaluate whether the law “has a real tendency to promote or 
protect the public interest and safety, whether it bears a reasonable relation 
to such end, and whether the interests of the public generally, as distin-
guished from the interests of a particular class, reasonably require the pro-
tection of this restrictive legislation.”27   
Following the lead of other state courts that had addressed the issue,28 
the Tennessee court concluded that the new licensing requirement was de-
signed more for “the protection of accountants certified . . . and not for the 
protection of the public in general” and thus illegitimately confers a special 
privilege of entering into private contracts “upon this class” while “unrea-
sonably” withholding it from others.29  The quality of accounting services 
did not “directly affect the public, but affected only the parties” in the rela-
tionship.  Therefore, state regulation of accountants was no more warranted 
here than when any other two private actors entered into a private contract 
                                                          
 22.  TENN. CONST. of 1870, art. I, § 8. 
 23.  See id. at. art. XI, § 8 (“The Legislature shall have no power to suspend any general law 
for the benefit of any particular individual, nor to pass any law for the benefit of individuals in-
consistent with the general laws of the land; nor to pass any law granting to any individual or in-
dividuals, rights, privileges, immunitie[s], or exemptions other than such as may be, by the same 
law extended to any member of the community, who may be able to bring himself within the pro-
visions of such law.”). 
 24.  Campbell, 52 S.W.2d at 163. 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  262 U.S. 390 (1923). 
 27.  Campbell, 52 S.W.2d at 164. 
 28.  Id. at 163 (citing Short v. Riedell, 233 P. 684 (Okla. 1924); Frazer v. Shelton, 150 N.E. 
696 (Ill. 1926)). 
 29.  Campbell, 52 S.W.2d at 164. 
 388 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [VOL. 75:383 
for services or goods.30  The “remote and indefinite” benefits to the public 
could not override the rights of the private individuals involved in these 
transactions.31  Individuals had the right to do things in private, including 
risky things, so long as there was no demonstrable, directly evident harm to 
the general public. 
The Jacksonian textual provision against the legislative conferral of 
special privileges upon some private actors to the detriment of others rein-
forced the more free-floating concerns that ran through the general due pro-
cess and police powers jurisprudence.32  Tennessee’s original Declaration 
of Rights included a “law of the land” provision, which was carried forward 
in subsequent constitutions.33  This early constitution also included a prohi-
bition on “monopolies,” declaring that they were “contrary to the Genius of 
a free State.”34  In 1835, Tennessee adopted a new constitution that carried 
forward the original Declaration of Rights.  But the new constitution also 
included a much more elaborate restriction legislation prohibiting monopo-
lies.  This new provision included a detailed list of schemes that were to be 
outside the power of the legislature.  The legislature was still authorized to 
charter corporations “as they may deem expedient for the public good,” but 
it was prohibited from passing laws “for the benefits of individuals incon-
sistent with the general laws of the land” or from granting “any individual 
or individuals, rights, privileges, immunities, or exemptions, other than 
such as may be, by the same law, extended to any member of the communi-
ty who may be able to bring himself within the provisions of such law.”35  
While the court in Campbell did not dwell on the question of whether ac-
countants such as Campbell could have brought themselves within the pro-
visions of the new statute granting special privileges to certified public ac-
countants, such textual provisions reinforced the general constitutional bias 
against creating artificial and arbitrary distinctions among citizens and be-
stowing special favors on the politically privileged. 
A second case, Gross v. Gates,36 comes from Vermont, where in 1937 
the legislature directed the state’s auditor of accounts to pay three thousand 
dollars to the widow of a deputy sheriff recently murdered in the line of du-
ty.37  The auditor objected, arguing that the directive violated a state consti-
tutional principle that the government is “instituted for the common bene-
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fit . . . and not for the particular emolument or advantage of any single man, 
family, or set of men, who are a part only of that community.”38  In short, 
the statute ran afoul of the prohibition on the “appropriation of public funds 
to private uses.”39  The state constitution required that public funds only be 
used for public purposes, challenging the court to identify what constituted 
a valid public purpose and what constituted an illegitimate private benefit.  
The court pointed to a long legislative practice of passing special acts “for 
the relief of those injured while in the actual service of the State,” but hesi-
tated before the case of a public officer injured “in the service of civil pro-
cess.”40  The court further hesitated to provide public funds for the benefit 
of the officer’s family members rather than the relief of the public officer 
himself.  The “legislative construction”41 of the constitution, however, es-
tablished that the legislature could discharge “a moral obligation that rests 
upon it”42—that was a public purpose, even if an individual privately 
gained from it. 
The puzzle for the court was whether any such moral obligations could 
arise when the injured individual was not acting on behalf of the state but 
was instead serving a capias warrant in a civil suit when he was killed by 
the subject of the warrant.  A majority of the court was persuaded that the 
deputy was nonetheless serving a public function at the time of his death, 
and thus his injury imposed a moral obligation on the state that was appro-
priately relieved by a gift to his family.  The deputy may have been acting 
for the “benefit of a private individual” at the time of his death, but he did 
so “by the command of the law.”43  By contrast, a dissenting justice con-
cluded that legislatures could not “reach the pocketbook of the taxpayers” 
to compensate someone injured while not in the “actual service of the State” 
but rather working on behalf of a “private individual,” like a civil process 
server.44  The Gates case illustrates how taxing and spending provisions of 
state constitutions often emphasized that funds could only be raised and ex-
pended by the state for the benefit of the public, leaving to constitutional 
interpreters the task of separating the public from the private. 
A final case, Ellerbe v. David,45 comes from South Carolina, where the 
legislature exempted from state taxes for 1937 the residents of designated 
school districts in Marlboro County who had suffered severe hail damage.46  
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County residents from outside of those designated districts (some of whom 
had also suffered hail damage) sued.  While the South Carolina legislature’s 
power to tax was not inherently limited, the state constitution directed that it 
provide a uniform rate of assessment and taxation, subject only to a narrow 
set of exemptions.47  Those exemptions emphasized distinctly public pur-
poses, whether municipal, educational, or charitable.  For the Ellerbe court, 
it was clear that the tax exemption for the private property of the hail suf-
ferers benefited only those individuals, “not the public at large,” and ad-
vancing the “interests of private individuals is essentially of a private na-
ture” and not a legitimate public purpose.48  Such state constitutional 
provisions carefully specifying the conditions under which the state could 
raise or spend money or create fiscal liabilities invited, perhaps necessitat-
ed, efforts to distinguish public purposes from private benefits and draw 
boundaries between the public and private realms.  Court cases evaluating 
whether taxes were imposed or public funds were spent for genuinely pub-
lic purposes were myriad.49 
The detailed constitutional provisions contained in state constitutions 
create a more difficult dilemma than the one faced by the U.S. Supreme 
Court in the 1930s.  Edward Corwin complained that the U.S. Supreme 
Court inappropriately doubted “whether the government is entitled to ex-
pend the public funds for the primary benefit of private persons in the ex-
pectation of thereby promoting an ulterior public good.”50  The Justices 
might have been prone to reading such a principle into the vague require-
ments of the Due Process Clause, but the drafters of state constitutions had 
gone further in imposing restrictions on legislative discretion.  Burned once 
too often by political corruption and ill-considered legislative schemes, vot-
ers also emphasized their desire that legislators not fritter away public re-
sources on private enterprises.51  Necessity being the mother of invention, 
politicians often responded with creative new devices for circumventing 
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fiscal limitations.52  Courts increasingly responded by minimizing the sig-
nificance of such provisions.53  In the New Deal era, however, such provi-
sions posed a dilemma for constitutional interpreters.  As political reformers 
pressed politicians to identify the public benefits that could come from pub-
lic expenditures to private persons, judges were forced to struggle in cases 
with constitutional provisions that disfavored such transactions, both mo-
mentous and mundane.  These cases were premised on the understanding 
that it was possible to distinguish between a public and a private sphere.  
Where federal judges could push aside inherited doctrine as not implicating 
“a specific prohibition of the Constitution,”54 as Justice Stone put it, state 
judges were in the trickier situation of working with explicit constitutional 
limitations on how legislators could raise and spend public funds. 
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